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COMMENT
By JOSEPH F. COATES
INCE Professor Jones has sufficiently dealt with the latter portion of
Dr. Curlin's paper, covering the craft aspects of implementing his
various proposals, I will limit the scope of my remarks to the first part
of the paper, which in my estimation contains most of the dubious and
questionable assumptions.
In my opinion, Dr. Curlin's entire argument concerning assessment
and the disruptive role technology plays in social change cannot only be
handled without the intrusion of values, but insofar as this is done, the
result will be a cleaner and more precise analysis. In other words, moral
tone, as a force behind analysis, ought to be diligently and totally expunged. Thus, if one is to perform a professional job of analysis, he
must be, in a very real sense, antiseptic - he must be free of the adversary position.
An example of the disruptive effect of technology vis-a-vis social
change was noted in Curlin's reference to the automobile. The resulting
disruption, he suggests, may be seen in the development of the suburbs
and the corresponding death of the core-city. Indeed, we do have
suburbs, and we have had a decline of downtown areas, but the main
cause has not been technology; instead, it is a rather perverse set of
tax incentives which has caused this phenomena. Thus, the issue is not
primarily technological; rather, it is a traditional issue of manipulating
fiscal agencies by means of public policy. Simply because technology
is one of several components which comprise the system with which
one happens to be distressed, it does not necessarily follow that technology, rather than some traditional component, is the thing to be
manipulated.
Perhaps it is equally fallacious to assume that when our present
institutions, the market, the courts, and the legislatures, engage in
technology assessment, they are ineffective.
I suspect that the common beliefs about these institutions as
effective technology assessors are irrelevant due to the failure to utilize
the institutions for that purpose. Moreover, even where there has been
utilization of the institutions, it has not been accompanied by an
effective evaluation of the derivative benefits. Therefore I would contend that one has to look past the question of whether it is actually
technology which is at fault in order to develop new insights as to
where to probe in the manipulation of public policy. To support this
hypothesis, I will address my comments to two of Curlin's "traditional
actors," the market and the legislature.
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Curlin concludes that the market has failed as a viable assessment
agency; however, the important question is not whether the market has
indeed failed, but has it ever been tried?
I would suggest a two part answer: First, certain aspects of the
market institution have not been tried, and second, the parts that have
been tried have not been properly evaluated. An example of this
improper evaluation, which results in an improper assessment, can be
noted in the area of liability insurance.
Looking at the insurance industry, one can see that it is the leading
advocate of unsafety. The entire operation of the insurance industry
depends on the establishment of an investment pool. That investment
pool, in turn, is extremely elastic due to its dependence upon rates.
The only method by which that pool can be increased is to have people
who need insurance. Clearly, one needs insurance because he has a
real or perceived risk. Therefore, in a simple economic analysis, the
insurance industry is the major public advocate of unsafety. If you
accept this notion, the question is, what are the tools that could be used
to manipulate the insurance industry, and in turn, to manipulate technology. The main sources that should be checked for an answer may
be social institutions, social invention, and social technology, not hard
physical technology alone.
The second of Curlin's "traditional actors" which I wish to comment on is the legislatures. Curlin suggests that due to the adaptability
of the legislative process, the legislatures are the most effective vehicle
of technology assessment presently available. I cannot agree. We live
in a crisis-susceptible society. The crises of the fifties established the
public policies that today are routine. Similarly, the crises of the sixties
are already embedded in our political system. Therefore, I submit that
our legislatures respond to the crisis of the moment. They do not
respond to opportunity, nor do they anticipate crises, except in a rather
narrow way. Thus, it is a serious error to suggest that the legislatures
are effective technology assessors. Even though that may be one of
their legitimate roles, they have not performed that function in the
past.
Having briefly voiced my doubts as to the efficacy of the market
and the legislatures as viable assessment agencies, I would like to turn
now to the more specific issue of the components of an assessment
agency, in whatever form.
While it is generally agreed that an assessment institution must
have a significant research component at its disposal, I must stand with
the minority and question this assumption. I do not think that there
should be a committment to one kind of institution, or one kind of
organization. Rather, since technology assessment can come in so many
forms, during such a long span of time, with variable durations, we
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ought to encourage various types of institutions to field assessments.
I do not mean to imply that one needs a physical facility to do physical
research, in order to conduct technology assessment; rather, I think
that, as a preliminary notion, one ought to look at technology assessment as essentially a paper and pencil enterprise in which the paper and
pencil serve as conduits for the mind's communications concerning the
future. Assessment is primarily analytical - synthetic, not experimental.
Since assessment is essentially an anticipatory activity, we should
always try to keep the beneficiary of the activity in mind; otherwise
the characteristics of the assessment will not be quite right. More
precisely, there may be serious differences between the temper, the
scope, and the intensity of the assessment, depending upon whether
it is directed toward legislative or regulatory action. On one hand,
regulatory action seems to imply a need for a more intense awareness
of the details of technological alternatives and practical consequences.
On the other hand, if one is doing an assessment at the legislative
level, it may require a different kind of assessment, since the objective
may be the formulation, rather than the execution, of a given policy.
I would suggest that we should be concerned with three basic
issues. The first is the influence technology has upon environment and
behavior. The second involves issues focusing upon the prevalence of
people - criminal aspects, privacy issues, and so on. The third, which
follows from the other two, and toward which I think there is strong
avoidance behavior, is the fact that central planning is the order of the
future. Unless the legal system is restructured, and fundamental cognizance is taken of the drive toward central planning, I think that the
legal structure will remain inchoate in its dealings with science and
technology.
My conclusion is that in any social dislocation, insofar as there is
an apparent, highly technological component, one ought to automatically ask the question: Is there a complementary social-technological
component, which either is a main component, or which could be a
main component in the manipulation of the problem? I would argue,
for example, that lawyers ought to be aggressively exploring new
measures of manipulating the insurance industry, which may indirectly
manipulate technology. The point of my emphasis, and the implication
that there is a growing need for a determination of how to explore
for society, is that social technology may be a dominant factor in our
corrective enterprises. The subsidiary implication for law schools is
and proliferate new social technology. Given the fact that there is a
fundamental dislocation between the structure of society and the structure of law, I suggest that the solution may lie in a total transformation
of the law. If we accept the fact that a transformation is needed and
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we do not inform our law schools and student lawyers of this impending
revolution, we will be doing them, and society, a disservice.
Basically then, in regard to technology assessment, I believe Curlin
is wrong. He says that the object of technology assessment is to increase
the desirable second order consequences and reduce to a minimum
those second order consequences which are unintended, unanticipated
and undesirable. I question whether that is really the intention of
technology assessment. It seems to me that it is not. Technology assessment is the instrument by which one explicates alternatives, and the
obstacle that must be overcome is the development of suitable and
incisive methods for bringing about analysis and exploration of alternatives. Assessment is something which has to be carried on continually,
as the unanticipated second and third order consequences of technological exploitation become apparent. As such, technology assessment
is a tool for the policy maker; it is not the policy maker. It should be
viewed by the policy maker as a conceptual enterprise, not a scientific
enterprise, to probe the future.

